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FIXING A BROKEN SYSTEM: RECONCILING
STATE FORECLOSURE LAW WITH ECONOMIC REALITIES
Yianni D. Lagos1
INTRODUCTION
The housing crisis ignited a chain reaction of events
that resulted in the U.S. economy cascading to the worst
contraction since the Great Depression.2 In response, not
only has the Federal Government proposed and
implemented various legislation,3 but the financial industry
has also joined in the effort to find a solution.4 However,
large-scale mortgage restructurings already show signs of
failing. 5 These results should not be surprising, because
1 Candidate for JD/MBA, June 2011, The Ohio State University.
2 S&P 500, a measure of the 500 largest U.S. corporations, fell below
700 points on March 2, 2009, the lowest level since 1996. See Google
Finance, S&P 500 Index,
http://www.google.com/finance?q=INDEXSP:.INX.
3 See Michael Corkery, Mortgage 'Cram-Downs' Loom as
Foreclosures Mount, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2008, at CI (allowing
bankruptcy judges to cram-down first mortgages); Laura Meckler,
Housing Bailout at $275 Billion, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2009, at Al
(providing funds to refmance and modify loans); Nick Timiraos, Real-
Estate Sector Cheers Tax Credit, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2009, at A4
(giving tax rebates for first-time home buyers).
4See Ruth Simon, Citi to Allow Jobless to Pay Less on Loans, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 3, 2009, at A4 (temporarily reducing mortgage payments
for unemployed borrowers); Ruth Simon, Investors Hit BofA Loan
Modification, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 2008, at Cl (engaging in massive
restructuring of loans); Meena Thiruvengadam, Banks Agree to
Foreclosure Moratoriums, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2009, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123454524404184109.html
(participating in voluntary mortgage moratoriums).
5 Loan Modifications Get Reviewed as Borrowers Miss Paying Again:
Is Aid Dragging Out the Pain?, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Dec. 19,
2008, at A6 (during QI and Q2, half of the restructured mortgages were
already back in default).
1
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general loan modifications suffer from the problems that
created the housing crisis. Namely, mortgage originators
did not examine whether the borrower could afford the
monthly payments.
6
The fact that the banking industry largely
overlooked what should be the primary consideration
before lending-i.e., the ability of the borrower to repay-
can be explained by the securitization of loans. 7 David
Wiechel,8 a distinguished practitioner working in the area
of foreclosure prevention, explained the complex process of
securitization as follows. General Motors Automobile
Corporation ("GMAC") makes loans until it runs out of
funds. In order to increase profits, GMAC needs to make
more loans. To raise the necessary capital to make more
loans, GMAC sells off its existing loans in a securitized
package. After consistently engaging in this process,
GMAC knows a market exists for its loans. Therefore,
GMAC lacks the incentive to examine the ability of the
borrower to repay.
9
The consequences of GMAC, along with the
majority of lenders, overlooking such risk led to the
6 Letter from Warren Buffett to Shareholders (Feb. 27, 2009), at 11,
available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/20081tr.pdf.
7 See generally Richard J. Rosen, The Role of Securitization in
Mortgage Lending, CHICAGO FED. LETTrER, No. 244, Nov. 2007
available at
http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/fedletter/cflnovember2007_24
4.pdf (discussing the procedures and major participants in the mortgage
securitization process).
' Interview with David Wiechel, former Legal Aid Attorney
specializing in foreclosure prevention, in Springfield, OH (Jan. 9,
2009).
9 Evidence of GMAC's poor loan quality is the recent capital infusion.
See Brian Wingfield, GMAC Gets Bailout Funds: The U.S. Government
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housing crisis.' 0 By the end of 2008, home prices had
fallen 23.4 percent from their peak." This burst of the
housing bubble took the economy with it, as unemployment
has increased. 12 Rising unemployment engenders increased
foreclosures. 13 In addition to the unemployment problem,
falling property values have pushed more homes
underwater. 14  Combining the effect of mortgages being
underwater with the fact that many borrowers contributed
little or nothing in the way of a down payment significantly
reduces a borrower's incentive to pay the mortgage.' 5 With
less incentive to pay, increased foreclosures have followed.
Foreclosures hurt not only the individuals losing their
homes but also the community as a whole. 16 For example,
10 Alexandra Basak Russell, What Gave Rise to the Global Financial
Crisis? The University of Iowa Center for International Finance and
Development (Mar. 2010), available at
http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/ebook2/contents/part5-I.shtml.
11 Sudeep Reddy, Home Prices Declined at Record Pace in October:
S&P/Case-Shiller Data Show Return to 2004 Levels as Tight Credit,
Consumers' Wariness Weigh on Sector, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2008, at
A2.
12 See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS FROM
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, available at
http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/SurveyOutputServlet?data-tool=latest_
numbers&series id=LNS 14000000.
13 Buffett, supra note 6, at 11.
14 "Underwater" refers to home values below what is left due on the
mortgage. See John D. Geanakoplos & Susan P. Koniak, Matters of
Principle, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2009, at A31 (chart showing that
mortgagors' chance of default increases as the amount owed goes
above the value of the home).
15 See Stephen J. Dubner & Steven D. Levitt, Payback Time: A Quiet
Exchange of Funds Lets a Family Buy a New House and Helps the
Seller Get a Good Price. So Why Is It Illegal?, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(June 10, 2007), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/10/magazine/lOwwln-freakonomics-
t.html (discussing how many homeowners were able to avoid paying a
down payment by using cash-back transactions).
16 Editorial, Foreclosures Still Destroying Neighborhoods,
SPRINGFIELD NEWS- SUN, Nov. 30, 2008, at A10.
3
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with this increase in foreclosures, vacancies have been on
the rise. 17 Increased vacancies lead to community blight,
which affects everyone in the neighborhood through lower
housing prices and an increased tax burden.18
Despite the devastating effects that foreclosures are
inflicting across the country, hope exists for those
individuals trying to save their homes. Agnes Spriggs saw
her mortgage payments balloon from $800 to $2,300.19
Her first efforts to refinance were thwarted, as she could
not work out a partial payment schedule with the lender.
2 0
However, with diligent effort and advice from a local
housing agency, she worked out an agreement with Chase
Bank and reduced her monthly payments to $855.1 With
banks incurring substantial losses when properties are sold
at foreclosure auctions and government agencies at all
levels providing significant aid, homeowners facing the
prospect of foreclosure should not concede to foreclosure
sale.
The securitization of loans created another problem
that directly affects the adjudication of foreclosures. As
explained by David Wiechel,23 many mortgages lack a
lawful mortgagee.24  During the securitization process,
17 See generally Haya El Nasser & Paul Overberg, No One Home:
Record 1 in 9 Housing Units Empty. Vacancies Have Ripple Effect,
USA TODAY, Feb. 13, 2009, at Al (discussing increases in vacancies
throughout the country).
18 Editorial, supra note 16, at A10.
'9 Elaine Morris Roberts, A Foreclosure Story with a Happy Ending:
Help is Available from Agencies, Lawyers and Banks, as Agnes
Spriggs'Saga Shows, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-SuN, Nov. 9, 2008, at DI.
20 id.
21 Id.
22 See Kathleen Pender, Help is Out There for Homeowners Facing
Foreclosure, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 14, 2008, at D6.
23 Interview with David Wiechel, supra note 8.
24 See In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d 650, 655 (N.D. Ohio
2007) (the Court made it clear that failure to repeatedly comply with
General Order 07-03 will result in immediate dismissal. One
4
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mortgages normally are not transferred directly from the
originator to the sponsor of the trust.25  Instead, the
mortgage passes to many intermediate holders, such as an
arranger and then a warehouse lender, before finally
reaching the sponsor of the trust.26 The many steps create a
trade-off. During each step, the parties can go to the
recordation office and endorse the new mortgagee or skip
the documentation and forego the expense.
With multiple steps along the way, the expense in
filing fees with the recorder's office, as well as paying
lawyer's fees, can become material. Hypothetically, if a
securitization contains 2,000 loans and costs $500 to
legally change title for each loan, the cost reaches
$1,000,000 for each transaction. This example illustrates
why a mortgage company would choose not to assign
mortgagees using the proper procedure. Then, when the
sponsor of the trust containing a mortgage forecloses on a
property, the sponsor lacks a claim, because no legal
mortgagee ownership exists. 27 Even if the sponsor records
a transfer after the default with the loan originator, the lien
is still unenforceable, because all transactions must be
recorded properly. 2 An attorney defending a mortgagor
requirement of General Order 07-03 is that "the named plaintiff is the
owner and holder of the note and mortgage.").
25 See Adam B. Ashcraft & Til Schuermann, Understanding the
Securitization of Subprime Mortgage Credit, Dec. 17, 2007, at 8,
http://www.ny.frb.org/research/economists/ashcraft/subprime.pdf (The
arranger aggregates mortgages from different loan originators and then
sells those packaged mortgages to a warehouse lender, who proceeds to
sell the mortgages in securitized form.).
26 Id.
27 See In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d at 653 ("To show
standing, then, in a foreclosure action, the plaintiff must show that it is
the holder of the note and the mortgage at the time the complaint was
filed.").
28 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.3204 (West Supp. 2010) ("If the
party foreclosing a mortgage by advertisement is not the original
mortgagee, a record chain of title shall exist prior to the date of sale
5
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can prove this flaw by examining the pooling agreement,
which is publicly available for all securitizations that would
show the sponsor of the trust received the mortgage from
another party.29  Therefore, a significant number of
securitized mortgages that make up a large percentage of
all mortgages are improper.
30
Lastly, securitization of mortgages increases the
difficulty for borrowers to work out an agreement with
lenders for two reasons. First, the party with power to
negotiate cannot always be located.31 Due to the fact that
servicing rights to securitized mortgages trade between
banks as if they were stocks, the borrower may not know
the loan servicer.32 Second, even if an agreement between
the borrower and loan servicer can be reached, the workout
agreement must be approved by all the investors.
33
under section 3216 evidencing the assignment of the mortgage to the
party foreclosing the mortgage.").
29 See Pooling and Servicing Agreement,
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1399057/00008823770700168
8/d676234_ex4-1.htm (example where the originators are listed but the
originators are not a party to the transfers taking place in the pooling
agreement).
30 See generally Liz Rappaport & Jon Hilsenrath, Fed Moves to Free
Up Credit for Consumers, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2009, at A1-A2
(reporting that forty percent of mortgages were securitized before the
crisis); Moe Bedard, The Mers Fifty Million Mortgage Meltdown, Dec.
30, 2008,
http://loanworkout.org/2008/06/the-mers-fifty-million-mortgage-
meltdown/ (one example of a shell corporation that securitized a large
number of mortgages and then sold those mortgages to trusts that lack
proper identification of ownership).
3' Roberts, supra note 19 (one estimate places the number of people in
foreclosure who have never talked with their lender at 60 percent).
32 This author was surprised to see that JP Morgan Chase Bank in
Columbus, OH, housed a mortgage-servicing trading room where rights
to servicing loans were traded as if they were stocks. In an
environment where servicing rights can trade daily, a borrower may not
know who is servicing his or her loan.
33 Melissa B. Jacoby, Home Ownership Risk Beyond A Subprime
Crisis: The Role of Delinquency Management, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
6
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Because ownership of the cash flows paid from securitized
mortgages is separated into multiple tranches, convincing
all investors to agree on a workout agreement can be
difficult.
34
Keeping in mind the present environment of
securitized mortgages, this note will examine state
foreclosure law. Part I will develop the public policy
framework for examining state foreclosure law. Part II will
introduce a basic economic cost-benefit analysis of general
foreclosure laws. Part III will examine different state
foreclosure laws and compare those laws to state
foreclosure rates. Part IV will examine recent legislation
passed by various states. Part V will discuss two scholarly
solutions proposed to improve state foreclosure law. Part
VI will summarize many of the proposed solutions and
present new ideas by looking at foreclosures from the
policy perspective favoring foreclosure prevention and
increased participation in foreclosure sale by potential
homeowners.
I. POLICY PERSPECTIVE
Foreclosure laws differ from state to state in many
respects. Unlike the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"
all attempts to unify state law have proven unsuccessful.
35
Many of these differences can be characterized as
defaulter-friendly or lender-friendly, as the foreclosure
2261, 2291 (2008); see also Ruth Simon, Mortgage Investors Call for
Changes in Housing Rescue Plan, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2009, at A3
(despite the severity of the foreclosure crisis, investors cling to their
right to reject mortgage modifications).
34 Jacoby, supra note 33, at 2291.
35 See Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure:
The Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1399
(2004) (explaining the Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act whose
framers attempted to unify state foreclosure law).
7
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debate has centered on the trade-off between protecting
homeowners and bank investments. 36 Both seem to be of
equal concern in today's economy, with foreclosures
occurring at a rapid pace and billions of dollars of
government bail-out money flowing to the banking
industry. 37 Although the traditional debate may be useful,
many scholars have recognized the inadequacies of
examining foreclosure from such a narrow perspective.
38
A general policy approach should be used when
examining state foreclosure law, but exactly what policies
should be used is a difficult question. Public policy
regarding foreclosures involves protecting the defaulting
homeowner. 39 Home ownership is a worthy goal in and of
itself, and in many instances homeowners will best
maintain the property.40  Yet homeowners should be
protected only when their interests coincide with the
interests of the community. The community cares about
avoiding the dilapidation of properties. When a
36 See Brian M. Heaton, Hoosier Inhospitality: Examining Excessive
Foreclosure Rates in Indiana, 39 IND. L. REv. 87, 92 (2005)
(classifying states as either "creditor-friendly" or "lender-friendly");
Karen M. Pence, Foreclosing on Opportunity: State Laws and
Mortgage Credit, 88.1 REv. ECON. & STATISTICS, 177, 177 (2006)
(characterizing some states as "defaulter-friendly").37 Show Me the TARP Money, ProPublica,
http://www.propublica.org/special/show-me-the-tarp-money
(listing 455 institutions that have received TARP funds).
38 Prentiss Cox, Foreclosure Reform Amid Mortgage Lending Turmoil:
A Public Purpose Approach, 45 Hous. L. REv. 683, 723 (promoting the
use of a housing policy approach to examine state foreclosure laws);
Jacoby, supra note 33, at 2263 (emphasizing the importance of
mortgage-delinquency management by looking at multiple policy
perspectives, but not altogether abandoning the lender-borrower
model).
39 Cox, supra note 38, at 723-24.
40 Id. at 727 (properties will be better maintained by a defaulting
homeowner than if left vacant).
4' Home ownership provides many community benefits, but all of the
benefits of home ownership assume that the homeowner is not in
8
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defaulting borrower wishes to remain in his home and is
willing to pay all he can afford to remain in the home, state
laws should increase the chances for homeowners to
maintain ownership. However, in many instances, a long
period between the initial default and a foreclosure sale can
lead to property deterioration. A property owner whose
home was just foreclosed lacks the incentive to reinvest in
the property. Therefore, the community deteriorates with
the property, as the defaulting homeowner's interest no
longer coincides with the community's interest of property
maintenance.
In addition to home ownership and property
maintenance, general policy should be concerned with who
purchases the property at a foreclosure sale. Three
potential buyers exist for a foreclosed property: an
investor, a new resident, or a lender.42 Public policy favors
a new resident. A new resident provides the best source of
maintenance for the property, because a new homeowner
would likely spend time and money to improve his or her
property. 43  Along with property maintenance, home
ownership is an important justification underlying a public
policy favoring the residential purchaser.44  Since
foreclosed properties are typically purchased at depressed
prices, home ownership originating from foreclosure sales
would be sustainable home ownership.
45
Bringing potential homeowners to the foreclosure
bidding will also create higher prices at foreclosure sales.
default. Jacoby, supra note 33, at 2277 (listing the community benefits
of home ownership).
42 Cox, supra note 38, at 729
43 See Jacoby, supra note 33, at 2277.
44 Id. at 2276-77 (describing three benefits to home ownership:
household wealth-building, positive social-psychological states, and
neighborhood and community benefits).
45 "Putting people into homes, though a desirable goal, shouldn't be our
country's primary objective. Keeping them in their homes should be
the ambition." Buffett, supra note 6, at 12.
9
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In times of decreasing real estate value, an investor will
only buy a property at below-market prices in order to
make a profit from the property, and many lenders lack the
expertise to effectively manage real estate. 4 6 Consequently,
a potential homeowner provides the only source of a fair
market bid. These increases in foreclosure prices will
alleviate the threat of delinquency judgments and may
provide equity to the original homeowner.
47
Most importantly, increased resident bidder
participation will speed the recovery of the economy.
Many banks are financially and administratively unable to
take on more real estate owned ("REO") because their
balance sheets have suffered substantially over the last year
and a half.4 8 This problem is accelerating as the number of
defaulting borrowers increases. Additionally, with the
inflow of foreclosures collapsing home prices, the need for
foreclosed properties to quickly find their way to
homeowners has never been stronger. Thus, business as
usual with lenders acquiring the foreclosed properties at
uncontested foreclosure auctions may no longer be feasible.
Lastly, banks benefit from the increased foreclosure
sale prices. Banks acquiring the foreclosed property take
the risk of re-selling at prices below what would have been
received at a foreclosure auction and face significant
transaction costs associated with the resale of the
foreclosed property. For example, WesBanco recently lost
substantial sums of money by buying three foreclosed
properties and then selling them later at a commercial
auction.49  These properties (which are located at 542 N.
46 See infra pp. 93-94 (WesBanco selling property at a large loss
illustrates their inability to effectively manage real estate).
47 See Cox, supra note 38.
48 Through the FDIC website (www.fdic.gov), one can search
thousands of banks and view the non-accrual loans on any bank's
balance sheet.
49 U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development Settlement
Statement on file with the author (hereinafter "Settlement Statement").
10
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Murray Street, 1741 Kentucky Ave., and 329 Fair Streetin
Springfield, Ohio) were bought recently from WesBanco at
a commercial auction for the gross price of $18,000.50 The
three properties in question were purchased at the
foreclosure auction by WesBanco for $15,000, $12,000,
and $20,000 for a loss of $19,000. 51 In a foreclosure, the
lender does not pay cash for the property. Because the
Springfield properties mentioned above were purchased
above the minimum bid, it is likely that another bidder was
willing to pay close to the final bid.52
Along with losing money on the resale of the three
properties, WesBanco paid significant transaction costs.
First, they owed a total of $1,641.67 in county taxes for the
entire year.53 Second, the broker conducting the auction
received a fee of $6,000.5' Third, the city charged
WesBanco $125.19 for a delinquent water bill. Finally,
WesBanco owed settlement charges of $72.56 These
transaction costs, combined with the low resale price,
resulted in a loss of almost $30,000 for the three
properties. 57 If the three properties had sold to another
bidder at the foreclosure sale, WesBanco would have
avoided this large loss.
5 0 
id.








57 Before the foreclosure crisis, banks were concerned with not writing
off losses. This author personally witnessed lenders bidding far above
the closest bid to reach the mortgage amount. By bidding the mortgage
amount, the bank avoided taking the paper loss. It seems banks have
been slow to recognizing the severe economic condition. Banks
purchasing foreclosed property below minimum bids is a losing
strategy that banks may stop doing in the future.
11
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With lenders, neighborhoods, and economists in
agreement, public policy favors a foreclosure policy that
creates more potential resident bidders. 58 Thus, foreclosure
policy should be focused primarily on homeowners. First,
public policy demands protection of the original
homeowner. Second, after it is clear that a homeowner
does not wish to work out an agreement to remain in the
home, public policy should favor laws making it easier for
a new homeowner to purchase the property out of
foreclosure.
II. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF STATE FORECLOSURE LAW
Foreclosure law is so intertwined with the economy
that a solid foundation in the economic issues surrounding
foreclosure law is necessary before an in-depth analysis can
be undertaken. To understand how foreclosure laws affect
the economy, one only needs to drive through one of the
thousands of streets that have been decimated by
foreclosures. Although this section only begins to examine
the many effects of foreclosure laws, understanding the
basic economic costs and benefits of foreclosure laws is a
necessary starting point.
Foreclosure laws can be broken down into three
generic groups. The first group of laws lengthens the
foreclosure process.59 A longer period of time between
58 Bankers across the country are concerned about changes in
foreclosure law, because they fear the lengthening of the foreclosure
process. See Rick Adamczak, Ohio Bankers Concerned About
Possibility of New Foreclosure Laws, THE DAILY REPORTER (Franklin
County), Feb. 3, 2009, at Al. This concern by bankers is warranted, as
they fear policy makers will focus exclusively on borrowers' interest.
However, by taking into account the whole community, public policy
may favor policies that aid lenders, such as shortening the foreclosure
process in many situations.
59 Both judicial foreclosure and notice statutes, discussed in detail in
Part III of this note, lengthen the foreclosure process.
12
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default and sale increases the probability that a borrower
will avoid foreclosure sales for three reasons. First, a
lengthened foreclosure period provides the borrower with
the opportunity to engage in negotiations with the lender
and to seek alternatives. Given the current state of
securitized mortgages, workouts have become increasingly
difficult.61 Not only is it difficult to find the party with
authority to negotiate, but mortgage modification takes
time, because the parties must reach an agreement that is
"commercially reasonable and sustainable. ' 62 In essence,
the obligation bankers failed to carry out-that is, making
sure people had the ability to repay-must be done by the
borrower and lender in any workout. Second, a longer
foreclosure period increases the costs of foreclosure,
making it more likely that lenders will pursue negotiation
before initiating foreclosure. 63  By decreasing the cash
received from foreclosing on properties, longer
foreclosures create an increased incentive for lenders to
agree to lower payment terms with the borrower.64 Third,
many individuals lose their homes because of
unemployment; more time means an increased chance of
finding new employment. With employment, the borrower
can resume making mortgage payments and save his home.
60 See Jacoby, supra note 33, at 2272. One alternative to a foreclosure
sale is short selling, where the defaulting borrower sells the property
below the amount owed on the mortgage with the lender's permission.
Id.6 1 Id. at 2291.
62 Interview with David Wiechel, supra note 8.
63 Cox, supra note 38, at 724 (citing Michael H. Schill, An Economic
Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77 VA. L. REV. 489, 496
(1991)).
The average rule of thumb in the banking industry is a 30 percent
loss on the mortgage when the mortgagor defaults and the property is
foreclosed. Interview with Sandeep Mawalkar, Risk Management JP
Morgan Chase in Columbus, OH (Mar. 6, 2009). By increasing those
costs further, a lender would be willing to accept low monthly
payments for an extended period of time to avoid such large losses. Id.
13
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If a borrower can reach a workout agreement with
the lender, the benefits include a homeowner not losing her
home, a bank minimizing its losses, one less house on the
market, and a reduction in the number of vacant homes.
65
Even if a workout agreement cannot be reached, the
borrower can still save his home by taking advantage of
various statutory protections and can protect the equity in
his home by finding a buyer in the market. 66  Thus, the
lengthened foreclosure process increases the probability
that borrowers will remain in their homes and that
borrowers will protect their interest in the property. If the
homeowner avoids foreclosure, the benefits extend to all of
the parties concerned.67
65 The benefit to the homeowner of maintaining ownership is obvious,
but the other three benefits may need to be clarified. Lender losses are
large in a foreclosure sale. First, because a lender is normally the
successful bidder at a foreclosure auction, the costs include time and
investment to maintain the property. After many foreclosure sales, the
property needs significant repairs just to comply with housing codes.
Second, transaction costs associated with buying and selling the
property can be high. See supra Part I (discussing the losses on three
properties sold by WesBanco). Third, another benefit is that there is
one less house on the market, which may not appear significant.
However, given the present saturation of houses for sale, decreasing the
inflow of foreclosed houses on the market will lead to a faster recovery
in the housing market. Lastly, vacant buildings have destroyed
neighborhoods across the country. See Nasser, supra note 17.
6 6See infra Part III.B (discussing the different forms of redemption
rights).
67 To quantify the benefits of prolonging the foreclosure process, one
would multiply the increased probability of a homeowner saving his or
her home by the benefits of a homeowner maintaining ownership
(individual benefit of maintaining home ownership + neighborhood
benefit of reduced chances of a vacant building + community benefit of
more homeowners to share the tax burden + lender benefit of reducing
losses associated with foreclosure). However, the benefits have not
been quantified by empirical studies, which provide an excellent
opportunity for economic statisticians to benefit legislatures by
engaging in detailed foreclosure research.
14
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However, the benefits of lengthened foreclosure
must be weighed against the costs in order to discover the
efficient outcome. Although the benefits of a lengthened
foreclosure process have not been quantified, there has
been substantial research on the costs.6 8  The costs that
have been measured include the increased expense of the
foreclosure process and lower loan amounts for the state as
a whole. 69 In addition to these costs, a longer foreclosure
period increases the chance for deterioration of the
property. 70 Therefore, the costs of a longer foreclosure
process include the increased costs to lenders, the reduced
access to mortgage lending, and the increased probability
of property deterioration.
Unfortunately, weighing the costs with the benefits
of a longer foreclosure period is a difficult task. Yet when
examining foreclosure laws that lengthen the process, these
trade-offs must be at the forefront of the discussion. The
efficient foreclosure length occurs when the benefits of a
prolonged foreclosure process equal the costs associated
with a longer foreclosure process. Given the lack of
empirical data, assigning numbers to the benefits and costs
would yield unsupported results. However, by looking into
different foreclosure laws and their effects, policy makers
can strike a fair balance with foreclosure laws.
The second group of foreclosure laws provides the
borrower with protection. These "mortgagor protection
68 This inability to accurately measure the benefits of lengthened
foreclosure may be the cause of a shift to less costly foreclosure
procedures. See Donald L. Schwartz, Comment, Power of Sale
Foreclosure After Fuentes, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 206, 209 (1972).
69 Id. See generally Terrence M. Clauretie & Thomas Herzog, The
Effect of State Foreclosure Laws on Loan Losses: Evidence from the
Mortgage Insurance Industry, 22 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 221,
231 (1990) (judicial procedure increases foreclosure costs); Pence,
supra note 36, at 177 (2006) (defaulter-friendly states have loan sizes
that are 3 percent to 7 percent smaller).
70 See Cox, supra note 38, at 726.
15
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laws" provide the borrower with statutory protections
beyond that of the mortgage contract. 71 These protections
take the form of rights to redeem ownership of the property
and shield the borrower from personal liability. 72 Although
there are many forms of redemption rights, the economic
analysis for each should remain the same. Similar to a
lengthened foreclosure process, redemption rights increase
the probability that borrowers will be able to remain in their
homes. From the previous discussion, the benefits of that
outcome are large. However, not all redemption statutes
are equal, and the benefits of different types of redemption
statutes should be compared based on the marginal benefits
and costs associated with each type of redemption statute.
73
The costs associated with redemption rights also depend on
the type, but the general type of costs are consistent.
Although some debate exists, redemption rights provide a
disincentive to bid at foreclosure auctions.74 In addition,
redemption rights could increase the chance of the property
deteriorating, because the defaulting homeowner or the new
purchaser delays making improvements to the property.
75
Along with redemption rights, delinquency rights
aim to protect the borrower.76 Delinquency rights take
many forms, but the basic idea is protecting the borrower
from personal liability. This protection of the borrower
provides the emotional benefit of aiding an individual in
71 Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection
Laws, 77 VA. L. REV. 489, 489 (1991).
72 See infra Part lII.B & Part III.D.
71 See infra Part III.B.
74 James B. Hughes, Jr., Taking Personal Responsibility: A Different
View of Mortgage Anti-Deficiency and Redemption Statutes, 39 ARIZ.
L. REV. 117, 134 (1997) ("The mere possibility of redemption
discourages bidders at the foreclosure sale because there is no finality
attached to the purchase.").
75 Id. ("[A] potential purchaser would face a disincentive to bid for the
property because, for a period, she could not maximize the value of the
property by making further investment in it ... .
76 See infra Part III.D.
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need; however, no economic justification is available for
providing such protection. Conversely, there is a "moral
hazard" cost associated with prohibiting deficiency
judgments.7 7  In addition, due to falling property values
across the country, many homeowners have lost all the
equity in their homes.78 With no equity in the home and no
concern for a deficiency judgment, a borrower would have
no incentive to make her mortgage payments or maintain
her property. 79 Thus, the social justification must outweigh
the economic costs for delinquency laws to be beneficial.
Finally, the third group of foreclosure laws involves
disclosure. Disclosure includes informing both the
defaulting borrower during the foreclosure process and
potential bidders before the foreclosure sale. 80  More
information allows defaulting borrowers to better
understand their options. 81  For example, a defaulting
homeowner has little hope of maintaining ownership when
she does not even communicate with her lender.82  In
addition to aiding borrowers, more disclosure also will
improve the foreclosure sale process. Low bidder
information negatively impacts participation and sale price
77 Schill, supra note 71, at 534.
78 Geanakoplos & Koniak, supra note 14.
79 Schill, supra note 71, at 534 ("Once a borrower's equity evaporates
because of falling houses prices or accrued, but unpaid, interests and
penalties, he no longer has any incentive to maintain the value of the
property securing the loan or protect it from waste if he is insulated
from personal liability.").
'0 See infra Part IV.B. 1.
81 A defaulting borrower will be unable to make life-changing decisions
without knowing all of the different options. See Avoiding Foreclosure
Toolkit, Doing Business with Freddie Mac, available at
http://www.freddiemac.com/service/msp/avoid foreclosurekit.html.
The easiest way for states to improve the foreclosure process is through
forcing lenders to provide crucial information to defaulting
homeowners.
82 Roberts, supra note 19 (One estimate places the number of people in
foreclosure who have never talked with their lender at 60 percent.).
17
7:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 1 01
at foreclosure auctions.8 3 Therefore, any increase in bidder
information will improve participation and increase sale
prices at foreclosure auctions. 84 Both forms of disclosure
increase the chance of home ownership, and the costs of
such disclosure are minimal. With such a large benefit at
almost no cost, increased disclosure provides a positive
economic outcome.
III. STATE FORECLOSURE LAWS
The differences in state foreclosure laws
demonstrate different ideological preferences. Many of
these foreclosure laws can be explained under the
traditional policy preferences of lender-friendly or
defaulter-friendly. 85 Judicial foreclosure, long redemption
periods, lengthy mandatory delays before foreclosure sale,
and delinquency restrictions can be classified as defaulter-
friendly. The other foreclosure laws can be classified as
lender-friendly. However, those preferences mistake the
real policy concerns regarding foreclosure laws that are
discussed above. Thus, when examining foreclosure law,
this note examines the effect of foreclosure laws on
reducing foreclosure rates (i.e., keeping borrowers in their
homes), and the effect of foreclosure laws on the resale of
the property (i.e., putting a subsequent homeowner in
foreclosed property).
A. Judicial vs. Non-Judicial Foreclosure
The first major difference in state foreclosure laws
is judicial vs. non-judicial foreclosure. 86  A judicial
93 Nelson, supra note 35, at 1421 ("[l]t is essential that buyers have
adequate information about the property being sold if market price is to
be achieved.").
84 id.
85 Pence, supra note 36, at 177; Heaton, supra note 36, at 92.
86 Clauretie & Herzog, supra note 69, at 223.
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foreclosure involves the court, while a non-judicial
foreclosure, commonly referred to as power of sale, does
not involve the court.87  Since judicial foreclosures
typically end in default judgments or with no defense made,
the practical consequence of a state having judicial versus
non-judicial foreclosures is that judicial foreclosures are
generally more costly and take longer to complete.
88
However, characterizing states as either a judicial or non-
judicial state can prove difficult. Many state laws that
allow non-judicial foreclosure contain rights and incentives
that make it more likely for lenders to choose judicial
foreclosure over non-judicial foreclosure. For example,
South Dakota allows for power by advertisement (non-
judicial foreclosure), but gives the borrower the ability to
request a foreclosure by action (judicial foreclosure).89
New York allows for non-judicial foreclosure, but
foreclosures are almost exclusively done by civil action
(judicial foreclosure). 90 Past studies have ignored these
intricacies, but in order to discover any correlation between
foreclosure rates and judicial versus non-judicial
foreclosure, these unique laws must be categorized in their
own group. 91 Therefore, states that permit non-judicial
87 Heaton, supra note 36, at 91 ("Judicial foreclosure entails court
adjudication of a lender-mortgagee initiated foreclosure action. In
contrast, non-judicial foreclosure gives the mortgagee the power to sell
the mortgaged property to the general public, without court supervision,
by placing advertisements.")
88 A judicial foreclosure proceeding can last just twenty seconds with
only two questions posed by the judge: "Are you current on your
mortgage and are you living in the home." Michael Corkery, A Florida
Court's 'Rocket Docket' Blasts Through Foreclosure Cases: 2
Questions, 15 Seconds, 45 Days to Get Out; 'What's to Talk About?'
Says a Judge, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2009, at Al.
89 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-48-9 (1993).
90 RML-SRNE NY § 2:19.
9' Failing to properly identify all states can lead to unsupported
assumptions. By only taking into account a handful of states, Heaton
19
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foreclosure but maintain significant exceptions that cause
many foreclosures to be performed through the judicial
process are classified as mixed foreclosure states.
With mixed foreclosure as a classification, twenty-
nine states are classified as non-judicial foreclosure states.
92
Eleven states are judicial foreclosure states.93 Nine states
are not classified as either a judicial or a non-judicial
foreclosure state; thus, those states are classified as mixed
foreclosure states. 94 Lastly, Vermont is the only state that
generally allows strict foreclosures.
95
came to the conclusion that non-judicial foreclosures lowered
foreclosure rates. Heaton, supra note 36, at 97.
92 Residential Mortgage Lending: State Regulation Database updated
January 2009: Alabama: RML-SRSE AL § 2:19; Alaska: RML-SRW
AK § 2:19; Arkansas: RML-SRSCN AR § 2:19; Arizona: RML-
SRSCN AZ § 2:19; California: RML-SRW CA § 2:19; Colorado:
RML-SRSCN CO § 2:19; Georgia: RML-SRSE GA § 2:19; Hawaii:
RML-SRW HI § 2:19; Idaho: RML-SRW ID § 2:19; Maryland: RML-
SRATL MD § 2:19; Massachusetts: RML-SRNE MA § 2:19;
Michigan: RML-SRNCN MI § 2:19; Minnesota: RML-SRNCN MN §
2:19; Mississippi: RML-SRSE MS § 2:19; Missouri: RML-SRSCN
MO § 2:19; Montana: RML-SRW MT § 2:19; Nevada: RML-SRW
NV § 2:19; New Hampshire: RML-SRNE NH §2:19; North Carolina:
RML-SRSE NC § 2:19; Oregon: RML-SRW OR § 2:19; Rhode
Island: RML-SRNE RI § 2:19; South Carolina: RML-SRSE SC §
2:19; Tennessee: RML-SRSE TN § 2:19; Texas: RML-SRSCN TX §
2:19; Utah: RML-SRW UT § 2:19; Virginia: RML-SRATL VA §
2:19; Washington: RML-SRW WA § 2:19; West Virginia: RML-
SRSE WV § 2:19; Wyoming: RML-SRW WY § 2:19..
9' Residential Mortgage Lending: State Regulation Database updated
January 2009: Connecticut: RML-SRNE CT § 2:19; Delaware: RML-
SRATL DE § 2:19; Florida: RML-SRSE FL § 2:19; Illiniois: RML-
SRNCN IL § 2:19; Indiana: RML-SRNCN IN § 2:19; Kansas: RML-
SRSCN KS § 2:19; Kentucky: RML-SRSE KY § 2:19; Louisiana:
RML-SRSCN LA § 2:19; Ohio: RML-SRNCN OH § 2:19;
Pennsylvania: RML-SRATL PA § 2:19; Wisconsin: RML-SRNCN
WI §2:19.
94 Residential Mortgage Lending: State Regulation Database updated
January 2009: Iowa: RML-SRNCN IA § 2:19; Maine: RML-SRNE
ME § 2:19; Nebraska: RML-SRNCN NE § 2:19; New Jersey: RML-
STRATL NJ § 2:19; New Mexico: RML-SRSCN NM § 2:19; New
20
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By classifying foreclosure laws into two clear
groups of judicial versus non-judicial foreclosure states,
comparisons can be made between the effects of these laws
on foreclosure rates. As discussed earlier, one of the
arguments in favor of lengthening the foreclosure process is
to deter lenders from initiating foreclosures. 96 However, a
regression analysis shows almost no evidence that the
longer judicial foreclosure process decreases the
foreclosure rate.97  When comparing the effects of judicial
York: RML-SRNE NY § 2:19; North Dakota: RML-SRNCN ND §
2:19; Oklahoma: RML-SRSCN OK § 2:19; South Dakota: RML-
SRNCN SD § 2:19.
95 Residential Mortgage Lending: State Regulation Database updated
January 2009: Vermont: RML-SRNE VT § 2:19. Strict foreclosure
allows the lender to directly take possession of the property through the
foreclosure process. James Geoffrey Durham, In Defense of Strict
Foreclosure: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 36 S. C. L. REV. 461,
472 (1984031985). Although historically foreclosures first used this
process, strict foreclosure is rarely used today. Id. at 4720E73.
However, contract law allows lenders to gain direct possession of the
property through a deal made with the borrower. John D. Hastie,
Conveyances in lieu of Foreclosure, C516 ALI-ABA 263 (1990).
96 See supra at Part 1.
97 Author applied regression analysis to data of foreclosure rates per
household for all fifty states during the last three years. RealtyTrac
Staff, Foreclosure Activity Increases 81 percent in 2008, RealtyTrac,
available at
http://www.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/foreclosure-activity-
increases-81-percent-in-2008-4551; RealtyTrac, U.S. Foreclosure
Activity Increases 75 Percent in 2007, RealtyTrac, available at
http://www.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/us-foreclosure-
activity-increases-75-percent-in-2007-3604; RealtyTrac, More than 1.2
Million Foreclosure Filings Reported in 2006, RealtyTrac, available at
http://www.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/more-than- 12-
million-foreclosure-filings-reported-in-2006-2234. This author then
compared those rates to whether the state was a judicial or non-judicial
foreclosure through use of a dummy variable. A dummy variable just
uses 1 or 0 to denote whether a state is a certain type of foreclosure
state. To test the validity of the regression model, this author compared
unemployment rates with foreclosure rates. Press Release, U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics, Civilian Labor Force and Unemployment by State
21
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versus non-judicial foreclosure on foreclosure rates for
each state during the last three years, the regression model
yields a correlation coefficient of less than negative
0.00066,98 which means that the effect of judicial
foreclosures on foreclosure rates is negligible.99 Although
regression analysis did not indicate any significant
correlation between judicial foreclosures and foreclosure
rates, judicial foreclosures may increase a borrower's
ability to avoid a foreclosure sale. 00 Unfortunately, little
data are available for rates of foreclosure workouts, but the
increased opportunity for negotiations in judicial
foreclosures makes it likely that judicial foreclosures
and Selected Area, Seasonally Adjusted (2008), available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/laus_01 272009.pdf; Press
Release, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Civilian Labor Force and
Unemployment by State and Selected Area, Seasonally Adjusted (2008),
available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/laus_01182008.pdf. The
results showed with over 99 percent confidence that unemployment
rates affect foreclosure rates. In fact, for each 1 percent increase in
unemployment, foreclosure rates on average increase almost 0.25
percent. With this evidence of the accuracy of the regression model,
the model could be used to test whether judicial foreclosures really
decrease foreclosure rates.
98 A coefficient of negative 0.00066 shows that states with judicial
foreclosure compared with a non-judicial foreclosure have 0.00066
percent lower foreclosure rates.
99 Given the simplicity of this regression model, no firm conclusion on
whether judicial foreclosures actually decrease foreclosure rates can be
reached. However, by looking at foreclosure rates for each state during
the last three years, which translated into 150 samples, one would
expect to see more evidence of judicial foreclosures decreasing
foreclosure rates if such a relationship existed.
100 Debra Pogrund Stark, Foreclosing on the American Dream: An
Evaluation of State and Federal Foreclosure Laws, 51 OKLA. L. REV.
229, 242-43 (1998) (Empirical studies showed that in Illinois two-
thirds of borrowers were able to prevent foreclosure sale by using
reinstatement rights, redemption rights, workout, or bankruptcy).
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positively influence foreclosure workout rates after the
foreclosure process begins.'
l0
In addition, the regression model showed almost no
evidence that mixed foreclosures caused lower foreclosure
rates than pure non-judicial foreclosures.' 0 2 Although the
results do not provide evidence that mixed foreclosure
states are preferred over pure non-judicial states, some
mixed foreclosure states provide interesting solutions that
benefit from the use of both judicial and non-judicial
foreclosure. A law that allows for a power of sale
foreclosure to occur, unless a homeowner requests a
judicial foreclosure, could lower foreclosure rates.
10 3
When a borrower files with the court requesting judicial
foreclosure, the borrower signals his or her desire to stay in
the home. This signal ensures that the borrower is
interested in remaining in her home, either through
negotiation or prolonging the foreclosure process. With
this knowledge, a lender is more likely to be willing to go
through the expense of a loan workout. 104
B. Redemption Rights
Another divergence among state foreclosure laws
involves redemption rights. Redemption rights provide the
borrower with an opportunity to save his property from
foreclosure. 10 5 Redemption rights may be classified into
101 Id.
102 The regression model showed that mixed foreclosures compared
with judicial foreclosures showed a negative coefficient of 0.003
percent, which means that a state having a mixed foreclosure state
instead of a pure non-judicial state causes foreclosure rates to decrease
by 0.003 percent.
103 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 43 (West 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
21-48-9 (1993).
104 Expenses that occur during a loan workout include the time to
negotiate and the costs of reinitiating the foreclosure process if the
borrower falls back into default. See Loan Modifications Get
Reviewed, supra note 5, at A6.
105 Heaton, supra note 36, at 92.
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three separate rights. One form of redemption right
(hereinafter referred to as "cure") provides the borrower
with the ability to save her property from foreclosure by
paying all past missed payments, plus interest and
expenses, but not including any accelerated payments.
10 6
Another form of redemption right (hereinafter referred to as
"equitable redemption") allows recovery of the borrower's
property by paying the full amount of the judgment (i.e.,
the total amount outstanding on the mortgage) or the total
amount of past due payments plus acceleration. °7 The last
106 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.090 (2008). "(1) At any time
prior to the eleventh day before the date set by the trustee for the sale in
the recorded notice of sale, or in the event the trustee continues the sale
pursuant to RCW 61.24.040(6), at any time prior to the eleventh day
before the actual sale, the borrower, grantor, any guarantor, any
beneficiary under a subordinate deed of trust, or any person having a
subordinate lien or encumbrance of record on the trust property or any
part thereof, shall be entitled to cause a discontinuance of the sale
proceedings by curing the default or defaults set forth in the notice,
which in the case of a default by failure to pay, shall be by paying to
the trustee: (a) The entire amount then due under the terms of the deed
of trust and the obligation secured thereby, other than such portion of
the principal as would not then be due had no default occurred, and (b)
The expenses actually incurred by the trustee enforcing the terms of the
note and deed of trust, including a reasonable trustee's fee, together
with the trustee's reasonable attorney's fees, together with costs of
recording the notice of discontinuance of notice of trustee's sale." Id.
(emphasis added)
107 See, e.g., FLA STAT. § 45.0315 (West 2006). "At any time before
the later of the filing of a certificate of sale by the clerk of the court or
time specified in the judgment, order, or decree of foreclosure, the
mortgagor or the holder of any subordinate interest may cure the
mortgagor's indebtedness and prevent a foreclosure sale by paying the
amount of moneys specified in the judgment, order, or decree of
foreclosure, or if no judgment, order, or decree of foreclosure has been
rendered, by tendering the performance due under the security
agreement, including any amounts due because of the exercise of a
right to accelerate, plus the reasonable expenses of proceeding to
foreclosure incurred to the time of tender, including reasonable
attorney's fees. . . ." Id. (emphasis added).
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form of redemption right (hereinafter referred to as "post-
sale redemption") provides the borrower with the right to
recover the property after the foreclosure sale. 10 8 In many
states, this post-sale redemption right permits the borrower
to remain on the property 109 and can last from ten days to
two years. 110 With these classifications in mind, one can
compare the benefits of cure rights to those of equitable
redemption, and the benefits of equitable redemption to
those of post-sale redemption.
The primary difference between cure redemption
and equitable redemption is that equitable redemption
imposes more costs on the borrower in order to recover his
or her property. Despite this burden, some states allow
redemption only by paying the full amount of the judgment
or paying late payments plus acceleration."' By forcing
the borrower to pay the full amount of the mortgage instead
of simply curing the past unpaid payments, these states
significantly decrease the chances for a borrower to avert
foreclosure sale. 112 This clearly detrimental policy to the
homeowner finds no justification from any policy
perspective. The lender is not substantially disadvantaged
from allowing cure rights, 1 3 and the quality of the property
will not suffer from giving a borrower the right to cure
instead of the right of equitable redemption. In fact, a
borrower will more likely take care of the property until the
foreclosure sale if there is a greater chance that she will be
able to remove her property from the foreclosure process.
Hence, cure rights should be preferred over equitable
redemption.
108 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-8-101 (2004) ("Real estate sold for
debt shall be redeemable at any time within two (2) years after such
sale.").
109 Cox, supra note 38, at 702.
110 Id.
.. See, e.g., FLA STAT. § 45.0315 (2006).
112 Cox, supra note 38, at 732.
113 Id.
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The difference between equitable redemption and
post-sale redemption rights is that equitable redemption
applies only to pre-foreclosure. 114 The benefits associated
with post-sale redemption rights include giving the
borrower another chance at saving his or her home and
increasing the cost of foreclosure, which might decrease
foreclosure rates. 115 However, there is evidence that very
few borrowers take advantage of post-sale redemption
rights.116 In addition, a regression analysis study compared
nine states offering lengthy post-sale redemption rights of
over six months with all other states; this study showed that
long redemption rights decreased foreclosure rates only
slightly.1 17  Conversely, the possible negative effects of
redemption rights include lower foreclosure sale prices and
the inability of potential homeowners to bid on the
property. 118 A potential homeowner would be unlikely to
bid on a home with the knowledge that he or she could not
inhabit the home for an extended period of time or that the
home could be taken from the purchaser for up to two years
after the purchase. 119 The successful bidder would be
reluctant to invest in the property until the redemption
114 Post-sale redemption rights are only available through statute.
Hughes, supra note 74, at 1290 130.
115 Hughes, supra note 74, at 133.
116 Id. at 135.
117 Residential Mortgage Lending: State Regulation Manual Database
updated January 2009: Alabama: RML-SRSE AL § 2:19; Iowa:
RML-SRNCN IA § 2:19; Kansas: RML-SRSCN KS § 2:19; Michigan:
RML-SRNCN MI § 2:19; Minnesota: RML-SRNCN MN § 2:19;
Missouri: RML-SRSCN MO § 2:19; New Mexico: RML-SRSCN NM
§ 2:19; Tennessee: RML-SRSE TN §2:19; Vermont: RML-SRNCN
VT § 2:19.. Similar to the regression model used to analyze judicial for
non-judicial foreclosure, this author used dummy variables. When
comparing long-redemption states to all other states, the results yield a
negative coefficient of 0.0026, which indicates that long-redemption
states have a lower foreclosure rate on average by 0.0026 percent.
'18 Hughes, supra note 74, at 134.
119 Nelson & Whitman, supra note 35, at 1439.
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period ceased. 120 Despite the high cost associated with a
long redemption period, long redemption periods only
marginally affect the foreclosure rate compared to other
states.' 2 1 Therefore, the benefit of slightly higher prospects
for home retention seems inadequate to compensate for the
costs associated with long post-sale redemption periods.
C. Notice and Delay Statutes
State foreclosure laws also differ with respect to
notice and delay requirements. These requirements take
many different forms and provide borrowers with different
protections. As one example of a longer time delay,
Maryland forces the lender to wait the later of ninety days
after default or forty-five days after notice of intent to
foreclose before initiating an action to foreclose.
122
Washington requires that a foreclosure under power of sale
take place only after 190 days from default. 123 In addition
to a long notice period, Washington requires the lender to
provide information to borrowers of their options while in
foreclosure. 124 If a lender pursues foreclosure by power of
sale in Vermont, there exists a seven-month protection
period from service of the complaint; however, the period
is shortened with evidence of waste of property.
125
Examples of states with shorter time restraints include
Texas, which requires notice of only twenty-one days
before the sale of the property, 126 and New Hampshire,
which requires notice to be sent to the mortgagor twenty-
five days before the sale.'
27
120 id.
121 Clauretie & Herzog, supra note 69, at 23 1.
122 MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-105.1 (LexisNexis 2010).
123 WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.040 (2008).
124 id.
125 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4531a (2002).
126 TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002 (West 2007).
127 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 479:25 (2001).
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Finding the point where benefits of an increased
delay equal the costs of increased delay is an inexact
calculation as every homeowner is different. As a means to
better differentiate between homeowners, Pennsylvania
increases the notice period for homeowners most likely to
benefit. Pennsylvania gives borrowers the right to meet
with the lender by providing a sixty-day stay on the
foreclosure proceedings. 128 By requiring the borrower to
request the meeting, the court only imposes the sixty-day
stay when the borrower is genuinely interested in working
out the loan. Once the borrower signals his or her interest
in retaining the home, the sixty-day stay gives the borrower
additional time to negotiate a workout.
Pennsylvania's solution reflects the same goals of
the states that allow both judicial and non-judicial
foreclosure. 29 By forcing the borrower to act to receive
certain protections, these laws separate those homeowners
interested in saving their home from those not willing to
put forth the effort. As discussed earlier, borrowers are not
equal. 130  Therefore, any law that separates borrowers
allows state legislatures to set up efficient laws by
providing different foreclosure delays. Although this note
does not try to calculate the optimal level of foreclosure
delay that state legislatures should seek, 13 1 bifurcating the
foreclosure process makes choosing foreclosure periods
much easier on legislators.
128 Residential Mortgage Lending: State Regulation Database updated
January 2009, RML-SRATL PA § 2:19.
129 See sources cited supra note 103. By allowing for accelerated
foreclosures, unless the borrower complies with a simple requirement,
these states streamline the foreclosure process for those not interested
in maintaining ownership.
130See supra Part I (pointing out that the borrower's interest may not
coincide with the community's interests).
13' This is an important question worthy of in-depth research on the
empirical benefits and costs of delaying foreclosures.
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D. Deficiency Judgments
Finally, state foreclosure laws diverge with respect
to prohibiting or limiting deficiency judgments. Deficiency
judgments occur when the foreclosure sale fails to cover
the amount owed on the mortgage. 32 Many states allow
for the full amount of deficiency judgments. 133 Other states
restrict deficiency judgments to when judicial foreclosure is
used, 134 while other states restrict deficiency judgments to
the difference between the price sold and the fair market
value of the property. 135 A few states completely forbid
deficiency judgments when dealing with residential
property.136 These different deficiency judgment
limitations do not affect lender incentives to foreclosure or
lender losses, because lenders typically do not collect
deficiency judgments in the states that do allow them. 137
Although deficiency judgments may not deter or
encourage lenders from foreclosing, deficiency judgments
create a perverse incentive to borrowers. 138 As previously
discussed, anti-deficiency judgment laws encourage
homeowners to walk away from their homes when property
132 Cox, supra note 38, at 703.
133 See Fed. Land Bank of Wichita v. Cummings, 735 P.2d 1110 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1987) (ruling that a creditor cannot be denied a deficiency
judgment if the sale is confirmed).
134 OR. REV. STAT. § 86.990 (2009)
135 UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-32 (2010) ("The court may not render
judgment for more than the amount by which the amount of the
indebtedness with interest, costs, and expenses of sale, including
trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds the fair market value of the
property as of the date of the sale.").
136 Residential Mortgage Lending: State Regulation Database, RML-
SRW CA § 2:19 (California).
137 Cox, supra note 38, at 703. It seems self-evident that a borrower
who cannot afford to pay a monthly mortgage payment would also be
judgment proof with regards to a lender collecting on the outstanding
amount of a deficiency judgment.
138 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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values drop below mortgage amounts. 139  Along with
enticing homeowners to default, anti-deficiency laws take
away an important bargaining chip that could be used by
lenders. For example, the prospect of a deficiency
judgment could persuade a defaulting borrower to turn over
ownership of the property to the lender. 140  Even the
supposed benefit of protecting the borrower by prohibiting
deficiency judgments lacks merit, as lenders rarely pursue
deficiencies. 141 Thus, no rationale exists for prohibiting
deficiency judgments, while allowing deficiency judgments
provides multiple benefits.
IV. RECENT FORECLOSURE LAW CHANGES
Given the severity of the housing crisis, state
legislatures have begun to reform state foreclosure law.
These reforms fall into two separate categories. First, some
states have enacted mortgage moratoriums and other
foreclosure delays for a specified period. 42 Second, other
states have enacted foreclosure statutes changing
substantive aspects of foreclosure law. 1
43
A. Mortgage Moratoriums and Foreclosure Delays
A mortgage moratorium delays all foreclosures for
a specified period. This delay can be the result of two
different types of laws. One type of law consists of a true
mortgage moratorium, where a state government prohibits
139 See Geanakoplos & Koniak, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
140 Other uses of the prospect of deficiency judgments as bargaining
tools are discussed later. See infra Part VI.
141 See Cox, supra note 38, at 703.
142 REAL PROP. ACTS. § 1304 (McKinney 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. §
38-38-108(1)(a) (2010); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-105.1
(LexisNexis 2010).
143 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.5(a)(1) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-
162.2 (2010); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. § 1304 (McKinney 2009); 2007
OH H.B. 138.
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foreclosure proceedings from commencing for a certain
period. 144 No state has undertaken this option, but some are
considering it. 14 5  The other type delay is when a state
government increases the length of time to complete the
foreclosure process. The technical effect of lengthening the
foreclosure process is a delay of all foreclosures. Many
states have chosen this option.
1. State Law Enactments of Foreclosure Delays
One state that recently increased the length of the
foreclosure process is New York. The New York
legislature recently passed a statute stating that foreclosure
proceedings cannot commence until ninety days after
notice is given to the borrower. 146 Since the enactment of
this statute in August, New York has seen a significant
reduction in the number of foreclosures. From October to
November 2008, foreclosures in New York decreased 31
percent, and foreclosures were down 55 percent for the
year.147  This large decrease is not surprising as many
foreclosure proceedings could not be commenced due to
the enactment of the statute. Given the temporary effect of
the statute, there is a high likelihood that foreclosures will
increase in the coming months. 1
48
Another state that has lengthened the foreclosure
process is Colorado. In order to lengthen the foreclosure
144 New York legislators are considering passing a one-year mortgage
moratorium. New York State Legislature to Discuss 1-Year
Foreclosure Moratorium, BANK FORECLOSURES SALES (Mar. 5, 2008),
http://www.bankforeclosuressale.com/wp/article-0305156.html.
145 Id.
146 N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. § 1304 (McKinney 2009).
147 RealtyTrac, Foreclosure Activity Decreases 7 Percent in November,
REALTYTRAC (Dec. 11, 2008),
http://www.realtytrac.com/ContentManagement/pressrelease.aspx?Cha
nnellD=9&ItemID=5543&accnt=64847.
148 However, the New York statute's purpose goes beyond just creating
a mortgage moratorium, as the law permanently delays the foreclosure
process. See supra Part II1.c.
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process, Colorado increased the cure period before the
foreclosure sale and eliminated the right to redeem after the
sale.149  Before this legislative change, the right to cure
lasted between forty-five to sixty days.'50  However, the
new statute specifically requires 110 to 125 days between
notice and sale.' 51 This statute increases the cure time from
110 to 125 days, because the borrower has up until the day
before the sale to redeem the property. 152  This trade-off
increases the borrower's chances to recover the property by
curing, while also giving cleaner title to the buyer of the
foreclosed property. 153  The change may have caused a
decrease in foreclosures. The bill became effective on July
1, 2007, and from November 2007 to November 2008,
Colorado saw a seventeen percent decrease in
foreclosures.' 
5 4
Maryland's approach to fixing the foreclosure issue
is similar to Colorado's approach. Maryland recently
passed an emergency bill to increase the length of the
foreclosure process. 55 Maryland increased the length of
time after default before a sale can be made to the later of
ninety days after the default or forty-five days after notice
of intent to foreclose. 56 Because borrowers maintain the
149 COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-108(1)(a) (2010).
150 COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-103(1)(a)(1I) (2007), amended by 2007
Colo. Sess. Laws p. 1832.
151 COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-108(1)(a) (2010).
152 COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-108(1)(a) (2010) (giving the borrower
until noon on the day before the sale to cure the mortgage).
153 The successful bidder at foreclosure auctions no longer needs to
worry about losing ownership through use of a post-sale redemption
right. See Hughes, supra note 74, at 134.




155 Emergency Bill: Environmental Matters/Judicial Proceedings, Md.
H.B. 365.
156 MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-105.1 (LexisNexis 2010).
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right to cure until one day before the sale, increasing the
length of time before a foreclosure sale increases the time
to cure. 157 As discussed before, this increase in time could
increase the number of borrowers who eventually cure the
mortgage and maintain possession of their home.'
58
However, Maryland's foreclosure rate has increased year to
date as of November 2008.
2. Policy Analysis of Foreclosure Delays
A true mortgage moratorium and the effects of
creating delays of foreclosure law create both negative and
positive consequences. The positive consequences include
allowing more time for the borrower to explore alternatives
to foreclosure and reduce losses to lenders as more
borrowers are able to negotiate mortgage loan
modifications. 159  The negative consequences include
exacerbating the losses in the banking industry, slowing the
recapitalization of the banking system, and delaying the
correction of the housing market. 160 The problems of the
banking industry should not be underestimated, but the
possible effects to the housing market show a particular
cause for concern. As emphasized in a congressional
research report, "evidence from the Great Depression
suggests that states that enacted moratoriums provided
relief to some homeowners but saw higher costs of credit
and fewer loans compared with states that did not."161 This
environment creates a trade-off of temporarily keeping
borrowers in their home with the hope that those borrowers
can work out a permanent solution versus making it more
157 Id.
158 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
159 Edward Vincent Murphy, CRS Report for Congress, Economic
Analysis of a Mortgage Foreclosure Moratorium, updated September
12,2008,
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difficult for new potential homeowners to buy a house. By
making access to credit more difficult, states could slow the
recovery of the housing market. Therefore, enacting a
mortgage moratorium requires careful consideration before
implementing. 1
62
Similar to the mortgage moratorium, the effects of
permanently lengthening the foreclosure process creates
benefits and costs. The benefits associated with a longer
foreclosure process are increased time for a mortgagor to
negotiate with the lender or to seek other alternatives, while
the costs include increased mortgage costs and dilapidation
of property. 163  This trade-off occurs often in the
foreclosure process, but the decision of the Colorado
legislature seems particularly well thought out.1 64 Colorado
traded post-sale redemption rights for a longer cure period
before foreclosure sale.' 65  This statute created an
environment where the borrower's opportunity to maintain
ownership is increased, while simultaneously making it
easier for a potential homeowner to buy the foreclosed
property. Curing the missed payments is easier for a
homeowner than paying the full cost of the foreclosure
sale. 166  Therefore, by giving the homeowner the
opportunity to cure the mortgage instead of post-sale
redemption, the Colorado legislature increased the chance
of a borrower being able to save her home. 1
67
Moreover, eliminating post-sale redemption rights
promotes increased bidder participation. The discouraging
162 This note does not argue for or against a mortgage moratorium.
However, as the economy worsens, many states may become increasing
interested in a mortgage moratorium to stop the foreclosure problem.
Before any legislature considers this option, research should be done on
the effect on the banking industry and the economy as a whole.
163 See supra Part II.
164 See generally COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-108(1)(a) (2010).
165 See id.
166 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
167 See id.
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effects of post-sale redemption rights on a potential
homeowner bidding are greater than the effects of
increasing the time between default and foreclosure sale.
For example, a potential homeowner will be reluctant to bid
on a house to live in when there is a chance that the home
could be taken away from him in the next six months.
With regard to a longer cure period, the only detriment to a
potential homeowner bidding would be the dilapidation of
the property, but that problem is just as prevalent with post-
sale redemption rights where the original borrower remains
in possession.1 68 Even without the original borrower living
in the home, it seems logical that a potential homeowner
will be more reluctant to buy a house when the house could
be taken away.169
B. Substantive Changes to State Foreclosure Laws
In an effort to curb the effects of the foreclosure
crisis, state legislatures have also made substantive changes
to foreclosure laws. States have passed legislation that
aims to improve the knowledge of the defaulting borrower
and provide the borrower with a chance to confront the
lender, ensure proper mortgage title, increase bidder
information, and improve post-foreclosure sale use of the
property. Even though changes to foreclosure law were
implemented with good intentions, some of these changes
have created perverse incentives.
1. Improving Borrower Knowledge
In addition to the ninety days provision discussed
earlier, the New York legislature passed numerous
provisions to aid borrowers and to help prevent future
168 See Hughes, supra note 74, at 134.
169 Post-sale redemption rights also discourage the new owner from
investing in the home until the post-sale redemption period has passed.
Id.
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foreclosures. 170 For example, a notice of foreclosure to a
defaulting borrower requires specific language giving the
homeowner a list of options, including telephone numbers
that borrowers can call for further assistance. 171  By
increasing the length of time for initiating foreclosures to
ninety days and by ensuring that mortgagors know all of
their options, the New York legislature created a legal
landscape more conducive for borrowers to retain
ownership. In addition, the statute created preventative
measures requiring no negative amortization and a good
faith showing that the mortgagor has the ability to repay.
172
The goal of this provision is to ensure that borrowers will
not lose their homes by regulating the making of the
mortgage.
Similar to the New York law mandating disclosure
of options, a new California law requires lenders to
illuminate the borrower's options. The law requires the
lender to make contact with the borrower thirty days before
filing a default notice in order to explore possible options
for avoiding foreclosure, including the right to request a
subsequent meeting with the lender that can be by
telephone. 173 The statute's goal is to put the borrower and
lender in contact. By giving the borrower the power to set
up a subsequent meeting, the law gives the homeowner,
who has the most to lose in this situation, the opportunity to
force a meeting with the lender. Since meeting the lender
precedes any negotiations, it is critical for the borrower to
have that opportunity.
New York and California are not alone in
revamping state foreclosure law. The Ohio General
Assembly recently passed a foreclosure bill with three
170 N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. § 1304 (McKinney 2009).
171 See id.
172 See id.
173 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.5(a)(1) (2010).
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provisions affecting pre-foreclosure sale. 174 First, the bill
provides Ohio courts with the power to require the
mortgagor and mortgagee to appear in person and to
participate in mediation.1 75  Given the fact that many
borrowers do not know who owns their mortgage, this
requirement gives borrowers a chance to explain their
situation and possibly save their homes through a workout
program. 176  A similar statute was recently passed in
Georgia that requires that the borrower be notified of the
name and contact information of the individual who has
full authority to negotiate and modify the loan at issue.
1 77
These statutory changes are in direct response to the
mortgage securitization problem, which makes it difficult
to know who really owns the mortgage and who has the
power to modify the mortgage.'
78
2. Mortgage Title Requirements
Along with the mediation provision, the Ohio
legislature passed a bill requiring that a judicial report be
prepared and issued by a title insurance company that
174 See generally 2007 OH H.B. 138.
175 OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2323.06 (2010). "In an action for the
foreclosure of a mortgage, the court may at any stage in the action
require the mortgagor and the mortgagee to participate in mediation as
the court considers appropriate and may include a stipulation that
requires the mortgagor and the mortgagee to appear at the mediation in
person." Id. (emphasis added). Forcing the actual mortgagee to meet
with the borrower ensures that a person with the power to negotiate is
present. Many defaulting homeowners may never speak to an
individual that has the authority to alter the mortgage, which greatly
decreases the borrower's chances of avoiding foreclosure sale.
Roberts, supra note 19.
176 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
177 GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-162.2 (2010) (requiring the notice to
"include the name, address, and telephone number of the individual or
entity who shall have full authority to negotiate, amend, and modify all
terms of the mortgage with the debtor").
178 See supra Introduction.
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contains detailed information on the property, the owner,
and any lien holders.' 79 The effect of this provision is to
weed out all lenders without proper identification of their
lien. As stated in the introduction of this note, many
securitized mortgages lack proper title. Without proper
title, foreclosures cannot be executed due to this provision.
Not surprisingly, Ohio is not the only state to pass this type
of statute. Georgia recently passed a statute that requires
foreclosures to be conducted by the holder of the mortgage
on public record. 180 Although a statute requiring proof of
title to a mortgage seems trivial, it is necessary that states
stress the need for proper recordation, given the improper
recording of many asset-backed securities.181
3. Increased Bidder Information
The Ohio legislature did not limit its focus to
problems caused only by the securitization of mortgages.
The new Ohio foreclosure statute gives the officer who
makes the foreclosure sale the option of holding an open
house for the foreclosed property if abandoned. 182 This
statute grants the officer in charge of foreclosure sales the
opportunity to significantly increase the bidding at
foreclosure sales.183  One of the major reasons why
properties are not sold at market value in foreclosure
auctions is lack of information. 184  Lack of information
makes it extremely risky for a one-time bidder to buy at a
foreclosure auction, because a person trying to buy a house
179 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.191 (2008).
'g0 GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-161(b) (2010).
181 See supra Introduction.
182 OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2329.272 (2010).
183 See Nelson, supra note 35, at 1422 (discussing the inadequacies of
the present auction-based foreclosure sale procedure).
184 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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for the first time typically cannot afford to buy a lemon.185
However, a repeat player such as a bank or investor can
afford to buy multiple houses at foreclosure auctions,
despite knowing that one or two of them may bring a
negative return. Therefore, increasing information by
allowing all potential bidders to inspect the house increases
the chances that a bidder who wants to live in the house
will bid, which in turn increases the price paid at a
foreclosure auction.
4. Post-Foreclosure Sale Reforms
Not surprisingly, given the significant foreclosure
problem facing the state, California's legislature made
changes affecting foreclosed properties after a sale.
California passed a law authorizing civil fines of $1,000 per
day for failing to maintain a property with fourteen days
notice required to comply with the violation.'86 This law
helps to alleviate the problem of deteriorating vacant
properties.' 87  However, the law also provides a
disincentive to buying foreclosed real estate, because the
fine of $1,000 per day can add up quickly. Also, the
fourteen-day notice seems to be an insufficient amount of
time for a homeowner to fix substantial problems with a
recently bought home that could have been vacant for a
long period of time.
188
Through the same law, California gave tenants sixty
days after the foreclosure sale to vacate a property.
89
Immediate possession provides the successful bidder with
185 Lemon commonly refers to used cars. This author uses the term to
apply to a property that needs significant repairs or needs to be torn
down.
186 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.3(a)(1) (2008).
187 See Cox, supra note 38, at 727 (discussing the problem of vacant
properties).
188 Some activities, such as house painting, cannot be done during
winter months in many states.
189 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.3(2) (2008).
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significant benefits. Such benefits include the assurance
that the property will not further deteriorate, the ability to
move into the house quickly, and the opportunity to make
improvements. However, because this law increases the
amount of time it takes for a purchaser at a foreclosure
auction to gain possession of the property, the law further
dissuades bidders at foreclosure auction.
California was not alone in passing laws associated
with foreclosed property post-sale. Ohio passed a law that
requires the officer who conducted the sale, normally the
sheriff, to record the deed conveying title to the property.'
90
This requirement helps to prevent the deterioration of
abandoned property, because many lenders or investors
who buy foreclosed property may not record their deed in
order to avoid city laws requiring the property to be
maintained. Dilapidated housing lowers the value of all
houses in a neighborhood and creates safety concerns for
the community. 191 However, many city code violations are
served on the new owners of the property the day after a
foreclosed property is bought. 192  The city waiting to
enforce housing-code violations until after the foreclosure
sale places a large cost on an individual wishing to
purchase a foreclosed property. Thus, a city must weight
the benefits of holding people accountable with the costs of
stringent requirements.
5. Policy Analysis of Recent Substantive Changes to
Foreclosure Law
When examining the recent changes to foreclosure
law through the lens of promoting home ownership, one
discovers that many of the changes to foreclosure laws are
beneficial and long overdue. Improving the knowledge of
190 OHIO REv. CODE. ANN. § 2323.66 (2008).
191 See Cox, supra note 38, at 727.
192 This author has personally seen housing code officials writing down
the names of successful bidders at a foreclosure auction.
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borrowers by making sure that they are privy to the
alternatives to foreclosure provides important benefits.
First, it protects the mortgagor from scams targeting
defaulting borrowers who lack knowledge. 19 3  Second, it
ensures that the mortgagor knows her options to protect
equity in her home. 194 Third, and most importantly, the
buyer knows of the opportunities to engage in negotiations
with the mortgagee in order to find a way to maintain
ownership. 195 Many laws go a step further by giving the
borrower the right to a meeting with the lender, which
increases the likelihood of a workout. 196 The appealing
characteristic of disclosure statutes is the lack of a negative
trade-off. The only cost associated with disclosure is the
time it takes the lender to educate the borrower.
19 7
Another enacted disclosure statute focuses on
educating bidders instead of the homeowner. Many
scholars have attempted to explain why foreclosure sales
are below market prices. 198 One logical explanation for the
low foreclosure price is the lack of information.
199
Allowing potential bidders the opportunity to view the
property through an open-house helps to resolve this
problem.20 0  A potential homeowner would never buy a
home on the market without walking through the home, and
in the foreclosure auction, that is exactly what a potential
bidder needs to do. Therefore, any law that increases the
193 See Mortgage Foreclosure Rescue Scams,
http://www.fraudguides.com/mortgage-foreclosure-rescue-scam.asp.
194 See Jacoby supra note 33, at 2272.
195 A recent study released by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation found that "57 percent of the nation's late-paying
borrowers do not know their lenders may offer alternatives to help them
avoid foreclosure." CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.5 note (e) (2010).
196 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.5(a)(2) (2010).
197 Educating the borrower should be the type of activity lenders
already engage in, but, unfortunately, that is not the case. Id.
198 Nelson, supra note 35, at 1422.
199 Id.
200 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.27.2 (2010).
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information of potential bidders will encourage increased
participation at foreclosure auctions.
Along with disclosure statutes, states have passed
laws explicitly requiring proper foreclosure recording.
20 1
These laws present a difficult problem. Because many
mortgages were improperly recorded, many mortgages
could be held invalid. °2 Although this outcome keeps
many borrowers in their homes, it comes at costs to the
financial industry. Given the fragile state of the financial
sector, invalidating a significant number of mortgages
would have detrimental effects on any state's economy. 
2 03
Hence, giving the borrower a windfall by voiding his
mortgage does not appear to lead to the most efficient
outcome. Instead, states should promote mortgage
modification where the lender still earns returns and the
borrower maintains possession.
The last type of foreclosure law modification affects
the foreclosed property after the sale. These laws aim at
making the buyer of the foreclosed property responsible for
the condition of the property.2 °4 Although the law does not
promote home ownership, these laws benefit the
community by forcing buyers to maintain the property.
20 5
201 GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-160 (2010).
202 See In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d 650, 655 (S.D. Ohio
2008).
203 Since securitized mortgages made up 40 percent of all mortgages
held before the crisis, prohibiting a large part of securitized mortgages
would collapse a state's banking industry. See Rappaport, supra note
30.
204 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2929.3(a)(1) (2010).
205 Although one would expect a purchaser at a foreclosure auction to
invest in the property, financial institutions lack the ability to efficiently
maintain the property. Since financial institutions will not maintain the
property, avoiding liability for the property becomes necessary. See
New Laws Provide Protections for Tenants of Foreclosed Properties,
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However, the laws create a disincentive to purchase
properties at foreclosure auction because of the uncertainty
surrounding local building inspector's decisions regarding
property conditions. Despite this drawback, property
owners should be held accountable for the condition of
their property, but state law must be fair by giving buyers
of foreclosed properties time to bring the property up to
code.
206
V. SCHOLARLY REFORMS TO STATE FORECLOSURE
LAW
Many suggestions have been presented on how to
improve state foreclosure law. Hence, an in-depth analysis
of all of the scholarly reforms would be overwhelming.
Nevertheless, two scholarly articles presented particularly
astute observations and recommendations that are worth
examining before one can formulate any recommendations.
One legal scholar, Prentiss Cox, recommended two reforms
to state foreclosure law when examining the law from the
housing policy perspective. 2 7 Furthermore, Grant Nelson
and Dale Whitman have argued for implementing the
Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act.
208
A. Prentiss Cox
The two recommendations made by Prentiss Cox
include separating the foreclosure process and increasing
206 For example, many old houses economically cannot be brought up
to current code, and requiring successful bidders to do so will lead to
vacant buildings. See Mary Kane, Lenders, Services Fight Anti-Blight




207 Cox, supra note 38, at 727.
208 Nelson, supra note 35, at 1399.
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the notice requirements to homeowners. 20 9 The foreclosure
process generally treats property owned by homeowners
and property owned by investors as the same. 2 1 However,
the two property owners act in distinct ways. Cox argues
that defaulting investors are in a worse position than any
potential buyer to achieve public benefits; therefore, they
should not be given preferential treatment.211 Conversely,
the defaulting homeowner should be given every
opportunity to retain ownership.212  Those opportunities
include delaying the foreclosure process and creating
reinstatement (cure) rights until the foreclosure sale.
2 13
Although the research is limited, Cox cites a study that
discovered evidence that a longer foreclosure process
promotes homeowner retention.214 In addition, Cox argues
for the benefits of reinstatement rights by explaining how
paying the arrearage due is easier than paying the whole
mortgage amount.
Along with the benefits of promoting homeowner
retention of foreclosed property, Cox refutes the costs
associated with longer foreclosures. 216  However, his
complete dismissal of the costs seems unsupported. Cox
first dismisses a study that found that higher foreclosure
costs decrease loan amounts. 217 Cox dismisses this study
209 Cox, supra note 38, at 727.
210 In the present crisis, most of the foreclosure aid has excluded
investor owned properties. Kathleen Doler, Investors Fight
Foreclosure on Their Own, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Dec. 5, 2008, at
A6.
211 Cox, supra note 38, at 729. It appears that policy makers agree that
investor-owned real estate does not provide public benefits. Id.
212 Cox, supra note 38, at 730.
213 Id. at 730-32.
214 See Stark, supra note 100, at 242-43.
215 Cox, supra note 38, at 732.
216 d. at 735-38.
217 Pence, supra note 36, at 177 (finding that defaulter-friendly states
have loan amounts that are 3 percent to 7 percent smaller).
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by arguing that lenders will become more careful.
218
However, more careful lenders mean less credit for
potential homeowners. Cox then rejects the waste concern
caused by a lack of incentive for defaulting homeowners to
maintain the property. 2 19  However, waste frequently
occurs in the case of foreclosed properties. 22 0 By
emphasizing the importance of these costs, one can weigh
the benefits and costs associated with longer foreclosure
periods to discover the most efficient solution.
22 1
Cox's second suggestion is to provide better notice
to homeowners disclosing all of their options before
solicitation by individuals seeking to benefit from the
defaulting homeowners predicament. 222  From an earlier
analysis, the benefits of disclosure outweigh the costs of
providing that notice. 223  Furthermore, the use of plain
language, as Cox suggests, ensures that the homeowner
understands his options.2 24 Cox also appropriately suggests
that providing a plain language notice before publication of
the foreclosure protects the borrowers from solicitors
seeking to take advantage of them.225  Thus, notice
requirements that provide plain language to the borrower
are necessary in order for the homeowner to make an
informed decision.
218 Cox, supra note 38, at 736.
219 Id. at 737.
220 The kitchen sink, bath tub, furnace motor, and copper pipes were
removed from the Murray Street property, mentioned in Part I, after the
tenant was evicted for non-payment of rent.
221 See supra Part II.
222 See Mortgage Foreclosure Rescue Scams, supra note 193 (listing all
the different types of foreclosure scams).
223 See supra Part II.
224 Cox, supra note 38, at 740.
225 Id.
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B. Grant Nelson and Dale Whiteman
Although the Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act
("UNFA") failed to gain large-scale support, the Act
provides many useful suggestions on how to improve state
foreclosure law. The most novel and beneficial aspects of
the Act involve improving the auction sale process and
providing additional alternatives to foreclosed property
disposal.
The first part of the UNFA focuses on improving
the auction sale process.227 The central theme in improving
the current system is improving bidder information. Bidder
information is improved by having access to title
information and general property information,228 and
inspecting the collateral.229 The UNFA requires the lender
to provide title evidence to each bidder who requests it.
23 0
The UNFA also authorizes lenders to make additional
information available to bidders, while exculpating lenders
from any liability for false information. 23 1  These
provisions aim at putting information, which is already
available to lenders, in the hands of bidders as well. Lastly,
the UNFA tries to strike a compromise between allowing
potential bidders to view the premises and "lien theory."
232
It does so by protecting a residential debtor from deficiency
226 Nelson, supra note 35, at 1430.
227 id.
228 Id. at 1434 (general property information includes "appraisals,
environmental assessments, surveys, engineering studies, [and]
inspection reports").229 Id. at 1435.
230 UNIFORM NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE ACT § 302(a) (2002). The
act even requires the person conducting the auction to have copies of
the title evidence at the sale. § 303(c)(7). Since lenders already
possess information on the mortgaged property, forcing them to
provide that information comes is a low burden. Nelson, supra note
35, at 1434.
231 UNIFORM NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE ACT § 302(b)-(c).
232 Nelson, supra note 35, at 1435 ("lien theory" states that the property
belongs to the debtor until the foreclosure sale).
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judgments if he acts in "good faith., 233  One of the
components of good faith requires the debtor to allow
bidders reasonable access to the property. 234 There can be
no substitute for inspecting the premises, and any way in
which a state legislature can provide that option to potential
bidders will increase the chances of a potential homeowner
bidding at the auction.
Along with increasing the amount of disclosure in
the auction sale, the UNFA eliminates the post-foreclosure
statutory right of redemption. 235 This post-foreclosure right
affects the finality of the foreclosure sale.236 By ensuring
that the successful bidder at the auction will in fact own the
property, the law promotes the participation of bidders who
desire to inhabit the residence.
Along with improving the auction sale, the UINFA
proposes two alternatives to property disposal. First, the
UNFA allows foreclosure by negotiated sale.
23 7
Foreclosure by negotiated sale allows the lender to sell the
property through the open market.238 However, the
borrower is empowered to reject any proposed sale.
239
According to Nelson, lenders would use a negotiated sale to
reduce transaction costs. 240 Although avoiding transaction
costs does provide a benefit, it seems unlikely that a lender
would engage in the process of selling the property when
233 d. at 1437.
234 Id.
235 UNIFORM NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE ACT § 209 (cutting off all
forms of redemption rights after the foreclosure sale has been
completed).
236 See supra note 114 (discussing the negative effects of post-
foreclosure sale redemption rights).
237 Nelson, supra note 35, at 1440-42 (discussing the different elements
of the rules regulating negotiated sale in the UNFA).
238 UNIFORM NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE ACT § 403.
239 UNIFORM NONJUDICIAL FORECLOsuRE ACT § 404.
240 Transaction costs are reduced by "complet[ing] the process of
property disposition in a single step, rather than the two-step procedure
usually employed now." Nelson, supra note 35, at 1442.
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that effort could so easily be wasted by the objection of the
borrower.
24'
Second, the Act allows for foreclosure by
appraisal.242 Foreclosure by appraisal allows the lender to
give the borrower an appraisal of the property and offer a
proposed amount for the property in order to take title.
243
This law allows the lender to streamline the process by
taking possession quickly. In many instances, it would be
profitable for the lender to pay the borrower to get
immediate possession to the premises. For example, if a
homeowner plans to simply delay the foreclosure sale in
order to get free rent, the property will deteriorate in value.
It is likely that the lender will acquire the property at
foreclosure sale, and since the lender is incapable of
repairing the property efficiently, the lender will be forced
to sell the property at a large discount to an investor. This
discount is the price that the bank is willing to offer the
borrower to get immediate possession. Although this law
does not directly promote home ownership, the law allows
lenders to preserve the quality of the house, thereby making
it easier for a potential homeowner to purchase the
property.244
VI. BENEFICIAL STATE FORECLOSURE LAW REFORMS
With a solid understanding of the different elements
of state foreclosure law, recent changes in state foreclosure
law, and scholarly perspectives of foreclosure law, one can
241 Given the present state of the housing industry, negotiated sales
would not be feasible. There is simply too much housing inventory on
the market.
242 Nelson, supra note 35, at 1444.
243 Id.
244 Although this law does not show up in statute, contract law allows
two parties to make such an agreement through use of a "deed in lieu."
Ron Lieber, Thoughts on Walking Away from Your Home Loan, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 14, 2009, at B1.
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begin to piece together the most beneficial aspects of each.
To determine which laws are beneficial, this article gives
preference to the goals of promoting homeownership
before and after the foreclosure sale. With all this in mind,
foreclosure reforms are necessary with two basic changes.
First, foreclosure law should not treat everyone equally.
Second, foreclosure law must be structured in such a way
to bring potential resident bidders into foreclosure auctions.
A. Foreclosures under the Dual System of Judicial and
Non-Judicial Foreclosures
The basic state foreclosure law debate of judicial
versus non-judicial foreclosure shows that there are
benefits to both systems. Thus, a system that allows for
both would be the most effective. 24 5  Power of sale
foreclosure should proceed unless the borrower complies
with a simple requirement, such as filing a request for a
judicial foreclosure with the clerk of courts. By mandating
that the lender provide the borrower sufficient notice of his
right to a judicial foreclosure and by making it easy for the
borrower to make such a request, the legislature can ensure
that judicial foreclosures will take place whenever the
homeowner has the slightest interest in maintaining
ownership. This small requirement for the homeowner to
receive a judicial foreclosure would easily distinguish those
interested in maintaining their homes from those who do
not, because those interested in maintaining ownership
would be willing to comply with the requirement.
2 6
Conversely, those with no interest in maintaining
ownership deserve no special treatment, and the foreclosure
245 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 43 (West 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
21-48-9 (1993).
246 A requirement such as a filing with the court or a letter to the
mortgagee would be performed by anyone slightly interested in saving
his home.
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process should proceed under power of sale.247 In addition,
investors would be unlikely to comply with the
provision.24 8 A defaulting investor lacks the incentive to
save the property and would not go through the expense of
fighting the foreclosure in court.
Although there are many options for implementing
a law that requires the borrower to request a judicial
foreclosure, some details of how such a law would look
could be beneficial. First, the law must provide clear notice
of the requirements to receive a judicial foreclosure. The
law should require the lender to provide the borrower with
the form to file with the clerk of the court. Along with
making the requirements simple, the notice should provide
for a sufficient length of time. The borrower should be
given at least one month to follow the steps necessary to
get a judicial foreclosure. 249 In addition to notice of the
judicial foreclosure, notice should be provided detailing all
of the borrower's options.250  After that period, the law
bifurcates into the requirements of judicial foreclosure and
non-judicial foreclosure.
If the borrower does not fulfill the requirement to
receive a judicial foreclosure, a non-judicial foreclosure
shall proceed. Non-judicial foreclosure should still allow
the borrower the opportunity to work out or redeem the
247 Under the economic analysis presented in Part I, the costs of a
borrower not interested in maintaining ownership far exceed the costs.
The probability of deterioration of the property is high while the
probability of the homeowner avoiding foreclosure is almost zero.
Therefore, public policy favors quickly moving on from one
homeowner to another homeowner with more incentive to invest time
and money into the property.
248 See Cox, supra note 38, at 729.
249 Picking an exact length of time is difficult, but legislatures should
ensure that the borrower has at least enough time to comply with the
requirement. For example, if the foreclosed party was a truck driver
that travels across country, he may not receive the notice until many
weeks after it is sent.
250 See Cox, supra note 38, at 740.
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mortgage; however, that period should be limited to curb
property waste. A period of one to two months seems
sufficient.25 1 This period should be further accelerated in
the case of a vacant or dilapidated building with the
decision of what constitutes vacant or dilapidated being
made by the code enforcement official or equivalent
office. 252 Then, publication of the foreclosure sale should
take place for a period of two to four weeks with the sale
taking place after that period. A period of two to four
weeks provides sufficient notice to potential bidders.
If the borrower does comply with the requirement,
judicial foreclosure shall proceed. Going through the
judicial process provides much of the time delay necessary
for the borrower to explore his options, but any law must
provide the borrower the opportunity to meet with the
lender. Given the difficulty of locating the individual with
the ability to modify the mortgage, mediation needs to be
encouraged or even required between the borrower and
lender.253 Either the judge or the borrower should have the
ability to require a meeting with a party capable of
254modifying the mortgage. When such a meeting is
requested, an immediate stay of foreclosure proceedings
should last until the meeting takes place.255 With mediation
and the delay caused by judicial process, the borrower will
be given ample opportunity to find a way to remain in her
home. However, as in non-judicial foreclosure, a ruling by
251 Again, picking an exact time is difficult; however, the period should
be relatively short because the chance for property deterioration is high
and the chance for avoiding foreclosure is low for a borrower not
willing to request a judicial foreclosure.
252 The costs of such assessment should be paid by the lender to ensure
that any claim of property deterioration or vacancy is legitimate.
253 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2326.06 (LexisNexis 2008).
254 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.5 (West 2008) (giving the borrower the
ability to request a meeting); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2326.06
(LexisNexis 2008) (giving the judge the ability to require mediation).
255 See Residential Mortgage Lending, supra note 128.
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a housing official declaring the building vacant or
dilapidated should accelerate the process in judicial
foreclosure.
In addition, the type of redemption right authorized
should be a cure right up until the foreclosure sale, which
provides the borrower with the greatest likelihood of
redemption. 2 56 The cure rights should consist of all past
due payments, any court fees, and attorney's fees.
2 57
However, attorney's fees should be limited to an amount,
such as $500, to avoid any excessive expenses.258
The benefits of this divergent treatment come from
the economic analysis provided at the beginning of this
article. 9 If a homeowner desires to stay in her home, the
increased likelihood that the homeowner will in fact stave
off foreclosure sale coupled with the benefits of a
homeowner maintaining possession lends support to giving
the homeowner significant time to explore her options.
260
On the other hand, if a homeowner does not desire to go
through the steps necessary to save her home, the decreased
likelihood that the homeowner will avoid foreclosure
combined with the benefits of home ownership are
outweighed by the increased likelihood that the property
will not be maintained combined with the costs associated
with the waste and deterioration of the property.2 61  Since
the costs associated with a longer foreclosure period are
256 See supra Part III.B.
257 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.090 (2008) (example of a
foreclosure statute that allows for the right to cure the mortgage without
any acceleration of the amount due on the mortgage).
258 Since attorney fees are only recoverable when the mortgagor
reinstates, lenders have the incentive to disproportionately allocate
attorney fees to foreclosures that are reinstated. See Keith Arnold,
Attorney Fees Can be Included in Costs of Mortgage Reinstatement,
THE DAILY REPORTER (Franklin County, Ohio) Feb. 5, 2009, at Al.
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higher with this group of homeowner, 262 these homeowners
should be given a shorter foreclosure period.
B. Increased Potential Homeowner Participation at
Foreclosure Auctions
In order to entice a greater number of potential
residents into the foreclosure bidding process, four things
are necessary. First, the potential homeowner must be
given a chance to examine the premises. Without actually
walking through the home, a potential resident will be
reluctant to bid at a foreclosure auction. Second, a
potential homeowner must be assured that if he or she is the
successful bidder that there are no disputes over the
ownership. Disputes over ownership would be caused by
faulty title or redemption rights granted to the original
borrower. Third, possession of the property must be
obtained quickly. Quick possession allows the successful
bidder to move into his or her new home and prevents
waste that is likely to occur from a former homeowner who
just lost ownership through the foreclosure process.
Fourth, there must be some assurance that the successful
bidder will not be immediately charged with multiple
violations from the code enforcement office. Although a
new homeowner will likely buy the property with the
intention of improving the property, a home that just went
through the foreclosure process may take time to
improve. 263  Hence, someone buying a property out of
foreclosure needs to be given ample time to improve the
premises.
With these qualifications to bringing potential
residents to the foreclosure bidding process, state
legislatures must change many aspects of foreclosure law.
There are two options to increasing access to the home for
262 Id.
263 Some improvements, such as painting, cannot take place during
some months of the year.
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potential bidders. First, state legislatures can abolish the
whole foreclosure idea of "lien theory." 264 Although such a
change may be unfair to the borrower, the state could enact
a law in such a way as to protect the borrower and allow for
potential bidders to inspect the home.265 For example,
legislation could be enacted to still preserve the borrower's
ownership of the property until a week before the sale, and
then require the borrower to vacate the premises to allow
for an open house of the property the day before the
auction. If a state legislature still finds those terms unfair,
the law could allow the borrower to trade the right to
possess the home before foreclosure sale for an extended
period, thereby giving the borrower an increased chance of
avoiding foreclosure while also providing potential resident
bidders the much needed access to the property before the
auction.
This scenario creates a state of limbo as to who
owns the property and who is responsible for the property
during the days between forcing the borrower to vacate and
the foreclosure sale. Although this question creates a legal
theory problem, the practical implication of this limbo
period is nonexistent. In the present law, the defaulting
borrower cannot be held accountable for the property
because the loans are uncollectable. For example, when
there is a housing code violation, the code enforcement
officials will wait to cite the new owner, knowing that the
defaulting borrower will not comply and has no reason to
comply with the housing code. So for all practical
purposes, the property is already in a state of limbo with no
one responsible for maintaining the property.
The second way a state legislature can allow
potential bidders to view the foreclosed house is by finding
ways to work within the present legal system. The UNFA
suggests allowing borrowers to exchange avoiding liability
264 Nelson, supra note 35, at 1435.
265 Id.
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through a deficiency judgment for showing the property in
foreclosure. 266 For this law to have any effect, deficiency
judgments must be allowed against homeowners.
26 7
However, because deficiency judgments are rarely
pursued,268 this exchange may not incentivize borrowers to
let potential bidders inspect their home. Another way to
improve bidder access to the home is by allowing a county
official to hold an open house for all vacant buildings.
Although this law does increase bidder access to a few
homes, the majority of homes that are not vacated before
the foreclosure sale will still not be viewed by potential
bidders. Both these suggestions will increase bidder access
to the foreclosed home, but neither will allow potential
bidders full access to all foreclosed homes.
In addition to improving access to the home for
potential bidders, state foreclosure law needs to ensure that
when buying at foreclosure auction the successful bidder
receives marketable title. The UNFA suggests that
evidence of title should be provided by the lender. 270 Yet,
271
the law allows for evidence of an attorney's opinion.
This note suggests requiring the lender to provide title
insurance at the lender's expense. Forcing all potential
bidders to pay for title insurance, given the fact that many
foreclosure sales are cancelled a few days before the sale, is
wasteful. Therefore, placing the burden on the lender
greatly reduces overall costs. With this title insurance, all
doubts about marketable title would be laid to rest before
the bidding takes place.
266/d. at 1437.
267 See supra Part III.D.
268 Jason Opland, Short Sale/Foreclosure Deficiency Judgments - Do
Banks Really Sue Homeowners?, RealTown, available at
http://www.realtown.com/jasonopland/blog/short-sale-foreclosure-
deficiency-j udgments-do-thebanks-really-sue-homeowners.
269 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.272 (LexisNexis 2008).
270 Nelson, supra note 35, at 1433.
271 Id.
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Along with marketable title, potential homeowners
need assurance that the property will not be taken away
from them through the use of post-foreclosure statutory
redemption. As discussed earlier, the post-sale redemption
rights provide no real benefit to the borrower and could be
a substantial deterrent for a potential homeowner at the
foreclosure sale. 272  Hence, post-foreclosure redemption
rights must be abolished to lure potential residents into the
bidding process.
Lastly, state foreclosure law needs to be more
accommodating to a successful bidder's situation by
providing for fast possession and giving the new buyer a
moratorium of the housing code violations. When the
property is vacant, there should be no delay in giving the
successful bidder possession. When the property is not
vacant, the law should provide for quick eviction of the
homeowner, tenant, or trespasser. Although this may seem
harsh, the homeowner, tenant, or trespasser is likely to have
had free rent for a long period of time. On the other hand,
the successful bidder will want to gain possession of the
property and take measures to maintain and improve the
premises. To that end of improving the premises, a
successful bidder must be given time. Laws that penalize
purchasers at foreclosure auction do not take into account
the time necessary to make improvements.273 Therefore, a
moratorium of at least three months from building code
violations should be provided.
VII. CONCLUSION
The inefficiencies of state foreclosure procedures
have been hidden by the success of the banking industry
272 See supra Part III.B.
273 As previously discussed, laws that require the property to be fixed
within a couple of weeks, in some instances, cannot be achieved. See
supra Part VI.B.
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throughout the last half century. Because foreclosure rates
have historically been a small percentage of total assets,
lenders were happy to get possession of properties through
uncontested foreclosure auctions. Lenders then sold those
properties on the open market for a gain or slight loss.
However, the present crisis has illuminated the problems of
state foreclosure law. Simply put, lenders can no longer
afford to take control of more foreclosed properties. Not
only are lenders losing money, but housing values cannot
be cured until foreclosed properties work their way into the
hands of homeowners. Therefore, foreclosure reforms
must be made.
These reforms must focus on improving the
foreclosure process through the lens of promoting home
ownership. This note suggests modifying the foreclosure
process in ways that increase bidder participation and the
passage of new laws that incorporate the best aspects of
both judicial and non-judicial foreclosure. Together, these
changes first will help prevent foreclosure sales, and
second, streamline the process of getting new homeowners
to buy foreclosed properties. The recommendations
presented only begin to scratch the surface of possible
changes to state foreclosure law, and it is this author's hope
that legal scholars will begin to examine state foreclosure
laws with the overall economic environment in mind.
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